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Abstract: The use of data to inform and run political campaigning has become an inescapable trend in recent
years. In attempting to persuade an electorate, micro-targeted campaigns (MTCs) have been employed to great
eect through theuseof tailoredmessaging and selective targeting. Herewe investigate the capacity ofMTCs to
dealwith thediversityofpolitical preferencesacrossanelectorate. Moreprecisely, via anAgent-BasedModelwe
simulate various diverse electorates that encompass single issue, multiple issue, swing, and disengaged voters
(among others, including combinations thereof) and determine the relative persuasive eicacy of MTCs when
pitted against more traditional, population-targeting campaigns. Taking into account the perceived credibility
of these campaigns, we find MTCs highly capable of handling greater voter complexity than shown in previous
work, and yielding further advantages beyond traditional campaigns in their capacity to avoid ineicient (or
even backfiring) interactions – even when fielding a low credibility candidate.
Keywords: Micro-Targeted Campaigning, Cognitive Modelling, Source Credibility, Political Messaging, Simula-
tion, Bayesian Modelling
Introduction
1.1 Over the past decade, political campaigns have increasingly used data to inform models of the electorate in
order to run their election campaigns as eectively as possible (Hersch 2015; Nielsen 2012). Aside from general
insights into population-level data, campaigns may also use personalized data to build individualized models
of the electorate (see e.g., Bimber 2014; Issenberg 2012). These models can then be used to find the most ef-
fective persuasion or get-out-the-vote eorts for that segment of the population. The drive behind data-driven
campaigns is to escape gut-feelings, intuitions, and heavy reliance on the past, and instead take a scientific ap-
proach to finding the most relevant citizens, developing appropriate persuasive material, and finding the best
way to motivate one’s base to turn out on Election Day.
1.2 Campaignsmay use two broad categories of data to run their campaigns. First, societal-level data provides gen-
eral insights into the population (e.g., which political concerns permeate that particular society). This provides
the campaign with a rough guide to figure out which issues might be relevant for a particular election – for ex-
ample, should the campaign focus on the economy, the environment, healthcare, and so forth. Further, some
democracies, such as the UK and the USA, operate a first-past-the-post electoral system. For example, in the
USA a Presidential candidate will gain 100% of a state’s Electoral College votes even if they only get 50.1% of
the popular vote in that state. In these systems, some states or constituencies may not be competitive (e.g.,
California is almost guaranteed to support a Democratic candidate while Mississippi almost certainly supports
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a Republican). In these systems, societal-level data can inform campaigns to where they should spend cam-
paign finances by calculating the expected electoral gain per persuaded voter, across each state. In this way,
societal-level data has been used for decades to run political campaignsmore eectively (Hersch 2015; Nielsen
2012).
1.3 More recently, a second data category has been used in political campaigning: personal-level data. While so-
cietal data can be used to describe population-level political preferences, regional electoral impact, and gen-
eral voter turnout, personal data can be used to model political preferences, electoral impact, expectation of
turnout, and psychological proclivities at the individual voter level (Bimber 2014; Issenberg 2012). That is, while
the general population may find the economy to be the most important political issue, a subset of voters may
feel the environment is themost important issue when choosing their candidate. Personal data can be used to
describe individual political preferences, psychological dispositions, and whether that voter is likely to vote. In
other words, using personalized data, campaigns can segment the electorate into any number of increasingly
specific categories to determine who to contact, what to contact them about, and how best to contact them.
Crucially, this also allows campaigns to determinewho not to bother contacting; an important factorwhen con-
sidering the time and financial constraints on complaining. These are psychologically informed, data-driven
analytic micro-targeted campaigns (Madsen 2019) 1.
1.4 Unquestionably, Cambridge Analytica is the most famous case of political micro-targeting to date (Cadwalladr
2017). They reportedly used psychometric and demographic data to segment American voters into categories
in order to developoptimizedpersuasion andget-out-the-vote eorts in order to assist Donald Trump’s election
campaign. There has been considerable disagreement as towhether or not Cambridge Analytica influenced the
2016 presidential election in theUSA. Indeed, some suggest they had a significant impact on the electionswhile
others contend that their methods are ineective and that predicting people generally is very diicult (Chen &
Potenza 2018; Nyhan 2018; Trump 2018).
1.5 Micro-targeted campaigns acknowledge that the electorate is heterogeneous: voters have dierent political
desires and priorities, see candidates as more or less credible, are more or less likely to vote, and so forth. For
example, one voter may be concerned about climate change, women’s rights, and the economy, while another
may be concerned about gun rights, worker’s rights, and the military. For campaigns, it is imperative to know
which voters to approach and in what manner, rather than simply contact each voter, and as such one needs
to understand why each voter chooses one candidate over another. Thus, while societal-level data may inform
the campaign to talk about jobs in Iowa, individual-level data break down Iowa into segmented populations
in order to describe what they desire and rate as important, how they see the candidate, and how likely they
are to turn up on Election Day. If the campaign has representative models of the electorate that are informed
by diagnostic and relevant data, segmentation of the electorate enables candidates to figure out who to talk to
(voter relevance), what to talk about them about (their political preferences), and how to talk about it (optimiz-
ing the persuasive eorts to fit that segment of the electorate). If the model of the electorate is good and data
is diagnostic, this should yield strategic advantages.
1.6 Studies on campaigning and political advertisement tend to focus on specific case studies. For example, they
have focussed on how Facebook was used in a particular election to advertise (Borah 2016), the consequences
of misinformation and online advertisement (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017), and the impact of television compared
with YouTube advertisements (Borah et al. 2018). Similarly, research projects have used data from specific elec-
tions (Bimber 2014; Issenberg 2012), or the exploration of party data sets (Nielsen 2012).
1.7 While these studies are important tounderstandhowpersonalizedpolitical adverts function in situ, they cannot
–bynatureof the specific context –address the fundamental impactofmicro-targetedcampaigningasageneral
tool. Put anotherway, whilst these studies have significant diagnostic value, due to the risk of being over-fitted,
their predictive value is limited. For example, following the use of Facebook data in political campaigns, the
company changed the API, disabling this access. As such, while papers discussing the use of Facebook data in
2016 provide relevant insights into that election, they no longer apply to current campaign management, as
access to data has changed. Further, it is diicult to assess the causal impact of one feature of a single-outcome
event like an election, as these cannot be repeated.
1.8 We can expect micro-targeting to become more prevalent in future elections, as psychological models of the
electorate becomemore accurate and personalized electorate data expands (in addition, micro-targeted cam-
paigns may also be used to disseminate disinformation more or less eectively, which is becoming a societal
issue). Consequently, we need to understand how micro-targeting works in principle (which may then be ap-
plied to specific contexts). That is, how eective are micro-targeted campaigns in comparison with campaigns
that do not use data to find the most appropriate segments of the electorate?
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Modelling Micro-Targeting
2.1 To test the eect of micro-targeting, we implement and extend an existing agent-based model (ABM, see de-
scription of this modelling technique below) (Madsen & Pilditch 2018). This model contains components for
exploring the eectiveness of micro-targeted campaigns, as it encompasses voters, politicians, and persuasive
connections between voters and politicians. In the model, voters entertain beliefs about a series of political
issues (e.g., climate change, the state of the economy, etc.). In addition, the voters rank how much they care
about each of these issues. Finally, voters perceive the competing political candidates asmore or less credible,
enabling them to revise their beliefs in the political issueswhen a political campaign contacts them. Politicians
in themodel, conversely, attempt to persuade the electorate that their position on the various political issues is
appropriate. In themodel, they do this by contactingmembers of the electorate during the election campaign.
When a politicianmakes contact with a voter, the politician transmits a persuasive attempt with regards to one
of the policy issues. The voter then uses a belief revision function (see Equation 1 below) to update their belief
with regards to that policy. Work in the simulation of voter preferences has investigated the role of voter politi-
cal attitudes (Kottonau & Pahl-Wostl 2004), and interactions between opinions and campaigns / candidates in
traditional campaigns (Hegselmann et al. 2015) and primaries (Stiles et al. 2020). Critically, thismodel contains
two types of politicians: a stochastic campaigner that contacts voters at random, and a micro-targeting cam-
paigner that selects the most appropriate voters to contact (using knowledge of the electorate to locate voters
who are likely to vote, who finds the candidate credible, and which political issues the voter cares about).
2.2 By formalizing connections, beliefs revisionprocesses, andkeeping confounding factors related to specific elec-
tion campaigns out of the model, it can be used to formally test the dierence between stochastic campaigns
that contactanyvoter randomlyandmicro-targetedcampaigns thatusepersonal-leveldata to informcampaign
outreach strategies. The model thus provides a new method to test the eectiveness of competing campaign
strategies and tactics (for example, the candidates can have any function for choosing who to target, making
the model framework capable of testing dierent types of micro-targeting strategies).
2.3 Thepaper expands theoriginalmodel considerably. InMadsen&Pilditch (2018), voters only consider onepoliti-
cal issue. While this allows comparisonsofmicro-targeted campaigns and stochastic campaigns for single-issue
campaigns (e.g., the proportion of the electorate who believe children should be vaccinated), voters are more
complex in election campaigns. They may choose a candidate in relation to multiple policy issues that may
carry more or less weight for the individual voter (see e.g., Horiuchi et al. 2018). Further, preferences may be
driven by individual factors such as social status (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2015). In other words, the electorate
is likely strongly heterogeneous in terms of their political preferences and motivations for choosing one can-
didate/party over another. Following this, the paper extends the Madsen and Pilditch model considerably by
including multiple political preferences and individual weights for each political preference. This enables sim-
ulations of a heterogeneous electorate (in the paper, we test multiple policy preferences) and how this impacts
the strategic capacity of micro-targeted campaigns.
2.4 In simulating the outcome of the engagement between the voters and the politicians, we test the eectiveness
of micro-targeted campaigns given an increasingly heterogeneous electorate. Specifically, we implement mul-
tiple policy considerations. The resulting simulations show that micro-targeting can take advantage of elec-
torate heterogeneity, side-stepping issues facing more traditional campaigns. Micro-targeted campaigns do
this by using insights about the electorate to push the most relevant issues with the most relevant weight. As
dierences within the population increases, so does the tactical and strategic advantage of knowing the elec-
torate. Methodologically, the paper extends the Madsen & Pilditch (2018) model considerably and oers a tool
for researchers to investigate the eect of information strategies on more increasingly heterogeneous popu-
lations. While it is not possible to re-run campaigns in real life, the model can test diering scenarios (e.g.,
dierent types of voters) and the eectiveness of competing campaigns strategies in these contexts. Moreover,
the model quantifiably measures the eectiveness of strategies.
2.5 It is diicult to assess the precise impact of micro-targeting campaigns in an election, or to know the election
outcome if they had not been active, or if other campaign strategies were used instead. The presence of myr-
iad confounding variables complicates the analyses of elections. For example, campaigns may have used in-
accurate models of the electorate, poor or irrelevant data, bad data management, or conversely, experienced
favourable conditions in that election, encountered poor opposition, or any number of other factors, which
may influence the outcome of a specific election. Thus, while it is historically interesting to explore the role of
micro-targeted campaigns, such as the impact of Cambridge Analytica in the 2016 presidential election, it is un-
informative of the eect of micro-targeted campaigns in principle. To measure the impact of micro-targeting,
we require events where comparable conditions can be repeated and analysed statistically. While this is tradi-
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tionally done with experimental methods, elections campaigns pose a methodological challenge due to their
interactive, dynamic, and highly complex nature.
2.6 Systems, such as election campaigns, that are dynamic and involve multiple agents interacting over time, are
technically complex (Johnson 2007). As systems become increasingly complex, individual and collective be-
haviours in that system become characterised by how they adapt and change over time (which may in turn
cause system-wide changes). For example, voters may change their beliefs about political issues as they hear
campaign messages from candidates, campaigns may change who they target as voters develop (e.g., some
voters may consider switching to a dierent party at the onset of the election, but may be committed voters
the day before Election Day), and campaigns may adopt entirely dierent strategies if competing campaigns
change how they act (e.g., a campaign may initially forego attack ads, but may choose to do so later if they get
desperate or if the opposing campaign deploys them). Models and tests of complex systems require dynamic
models. Agent-based models (ABMs) can represent how individual agents act and react to changes in the sys-
tem, making it an ideal method to simulate and test the eectiveness of micro-targeted election campaigns.
Method: an Agent-Based Model of Micro-Targeted Campaigns
3.1 ABMs are simulated multi-agent systems that describe the behaviour of and interactions between individual
agents operating in some environment (Bandini et al. 2009; Gilbert 2008). In the current model, the voters and
political candidates are the agents. They are interactive (Bonabeau 2002), meaning that agents can engage
with eachother andwith their environment (if needed). Further, they are self-organizing (Niazi &Hussain 2009),
meaning that agents can adaptwhen the context changes (e.g., a votermight be reachable by a campaign at the
beginningof an election, butmayhavebecomeentrenchedand therefore unreachable by the end–anadaptive
campaign can update who to target as the election unfolds. Finally, ABMs can be used to test cognitive, social,
and tactical or strategic models (Madsen et al. 2019),
3.2 ABMsconsistof threebroadlydefinedcomponents: Agents, interactions, and thesyntheticenvironment. Agents
(the actors within ABMs) can be endowed with any functions that are computationally expressible (e.g., learn-
ing, decision-making,memory, etc.). Further, the agents can be heterogeneouswithin a class (e.g., 10,000 voter
agents within the systemmay set their function parameters by drawing the value from a Gaussian distribution)
and between classes (e.g., voter agents may be endowed with some functions while candidate agents may
be endowed with entirely dierent functions). Interactions are any function that link agents with each other,
which can facilitate agent functions such as information transmission. Links can be direct (one agent passes
information to another who uses its learning function to update its beliefs) or indirect (an agentmay physically
displace when other agents come near). Finally, the environment describes the synthetic world in which the
agents live and act. The environmental features can be enabling (e.g., information transmission) or disabling
(e.g., geographical distance between agents may preclude information transmission). They have been used
in economics (Grazzini & Richiardi 2015), opinion dynamics (Hegselmann & Krause 2002; León-Medina 2019),
social sciences (Schelling 1978; Epstein & Axtell 1996; Heath et al. 2009), and to simulate human-environment
systems (Bailey et al. 2019; Carrella et al. 2019).
3.3 To go beyond individual case studies and just-so stories, Madsen & Pilditch (2018) developed a model to sim-
ulate interactions between key components of micro-targeted campaigns: The electorate, the political candi-
dates, and candidate strategies. In their model, Madsen and Pilditch simulate voters, political candidates, and
interactions between the candidates and the voters. Voters consider a hypothesis,H (this is a proxy for ‘which
candidate should I support in the election?’). Throughout the simulation, voters’ subjectiveH may change as a
result of their interactions with theMTC or stochastic candidates. To update their belief about whom to vote
for (H), voters use aBayesian source credibilitymodelwhere theposterior degreeof belief in ahypothesis given
a report from another person, P (H|Rep) depends on the perceived trustworthiness, P (T ), and the perceived
expertise, P (E), of that reporter (here, a political campaign candidate) (see Bovens & Hartmann 2003; Hahn
et al. 2009; Harris et al. 2016).
3.4 The use of the source credibility model is motivated by the fact that perceived trustworthiness and expertise
havebeen shown tobe important in political persuasion (Madsen 2016), civic participation (Levi & Stoker 2000),
the intention to participate in an election (Housholder & LaMarre 2014), and in persuasion and argumentation
more broadly (Chaiken & Maheswaran 1994; Petty & Cacioppo 1984). Further, social psychological findings cor-
roborate the division of credibility into perceived expertise and trustworthiness (Cuddy et al. 2011; Fiske et al.
2007). In other words, the inclusion of perceived credibility in themodel is empirically supported, and provides
a formal (Bayesian) frame to explore belief revision over the duration of an election campaign, furnishing the
JASSS, 24(1) 5, 2021 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/24/1/5.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.4452
voters in the model with the capacity to change their beliefs in a hypothesis depending on their perception of
thecandidate’s credibility. Specifically,whenacandidatecontacts thevoterwitha report (persuasivemessage),
the voter updates their belief thusly:
P (H|Rep) = P (H)P (Rep|H)
P (H)P (Rep|H) + P (¬H)P (Rep|¬H)
(1)
3.5 P (H|Rep) represents the probability that the hypothesis,H , is true given a confirming statement (Rep). P (H)
represents prior belief in the hypothesis, and P (Rep|H) and P (Rep|¬H) represent the probability that the
source provides a confirming statement if the hypothesis was true (H) or false (¬H). Perceived trustworthi-
ness, P (T ), and expertise, P (E), are integrated within P (Rep|H) and P (Rep|¬H) 2. Finally, the required
conditional probabilities (i.e., if a candidate is truthful (T ) and an expert (E), what is the probability they will
provide a true report? repeated for the 4 combinations of trustworthiness andexpertise) are taken fromMadsen
(2016) who derived these empirically (see Table 1).
T,E T,¬E ¬T,E ¬T,¬E
H 0.80 0.58 0.34 0.18
¬H 0.22 0.42 0.59 0.71
Table 1: Conditional probability table.
3.6 To illustrate this function in action, imagine a candidatewho contacts a voter about a political issue. The voter’s
prior belief is marginally positive (e.g., P (H) = 0.57) and the voter perceives the credibility of the candidate
pretty favourably (e.g., P (E) = 0.63; P (T ) = 0.71). In the model, as the voter receives the positive report
from the candidate (H = 1), the voter uses the above model to revise their belief. In this case, the voter would
revise their prior belief (mildly) positively given the report, making the posterior belief in the hypothesis given
the report, P (H|Rep) = 0.66, as the candidate is (mildly) perceived to be credible. Comparatively, if the voter
believed the candidate to be extremely credible (e.g., P (E) = 0.97; P (T ) = 0.93), they would revise their
belief more strongly (in that case, P (H|Rep) = 0.79). Conversely, positive reports from candidates deemed
discredited (i.e., P (T ) and/or P (E) < .5) would result in a dissuading eect, pushing the belief (P (H)) in the
negative (unintended) direction.
3.7 The fact that the source credibility model allows for negative eects of campaign outreach is in line with two
pieces of evidence. First, the so-called backfire eect has beenobserved in psychological literature (see e.g. Ny-
han&Reifler 2010;Wood&Porter2018). This refers to instanceswhenparticipantsentrenchandevenstrengthen
their prior beliefs when facedwith evidence contrary to this belief. That is, not only would the participant fail to
adjust their belief in line with observed evidence – or even ignore the evidence altogether – but actually move
their beliefs in the opposite direction. Second, in line with the backfire eect, Madsen (2016) used the above
Bayesian source credibility model to predict voters’ beliefs in the goodness of an unknown policy if a political
candidate supportedor attacked thepolicy. Despite noknowledgeof thepolicy, participants reportedposterior
degrees of belief in the goodness of the policy given their perceptions of the political candidate who supported
or attacked the policy. In line with the backfire eect, this eect was bi-directional, as voters who rated a can-
didate as very credible (high expertise and trustworthiness) increased their belief in the goodness of the policy.
Conversely, if they rated the candidate as not credible (low expertise and trustworthiness), they lowered their
estimation of the goodness of the unknown policy. Party ailiation had no impact on this eect, as Democrat
andRepublican voters updated their beliefs in the samemanner. As such, theBayesian source credibilitymodel
has been empirically tested (e.g., Harris et al. 2016), applied to political reasoning (Madsen 2016), and approx-
imates the well-known backfire eect (Nyhan & Reifler 2010). As such, we believe the model is appropriate to
include as themain belief revision function in the current agent-basedmodel. Given the probabilistic nature of
the Bayesian source credibility model, we can consequently map P (H) on to a voting preference dimension,
with P (H) > .5 corresponding to favoring one candidate, and P (H) < .5 corresponding to favouring the
other.
3.8 Finally, voters are more or less likely to turn up on Election Day to cast their vote. In the model, this is rep-
resented by the probability of voting, P (V ote). At the end of the simulation (aer 100 “days” or time-points,
knownas“ticks”withinABMs), eachvoterdecideswhether tovotewithaprobability corresponding toP (V ote).
That is, voters with P (V ote) = 0.25will typically vote in 14 of elections while a voter with P (V ote) = 1will al-
ways participate in the election. If voting, the voter consults the state of their belief, P (H). If P (H) < 0.5,
the voter supports the stochastic candidate; If P (H) > 0.5, the voter supports theMTC candidate. In the
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model, stochastic campaigns target voters randomly. By comparison, micro-targeted campaigns canmake use
of knowledge of the individual voters (their beliefs, whether or not they perceive the candidate as credible, and
whether or not they are likely to actually vote in the ensuing election). This provides the micro-targeting can-
didate with a significant tactical advantage. By measuring the outcomes of multiple simulated elections, the
model can test the general eectiveness ofmicro-targeted campaigns. Moreover, themodel can be used to run
dierent scenarios (e.g., setting the credibility of candidates dierently) and compare how the outcome of the
elections in these diering scenario simulations.
3.9 The agent-based model allows for voter heterogeneity, so as to represent the diversity of beliefs and disposi-
tions found in an electorate. When the model is initiated, each voter sets their individual function parameters.
These include their beliefs regarding their voting intention, P (H), how trustworthy they perceive each candi-
date to be P (TCANDIDATES) how expert they perceive each candidate to be, P (ECANDIDATES), and their
likelihood of voting in the election, P (V ote). Each voter in the model draws each value from a Gaussian distri-
bution (e.g., µ = 0.5, σ = 0.25). By drawing the parameter values from a normal distribution, the electorate
becomes heterogeneous as voters can dier in their belief in the hypothesis, their perception of the candidates,
and their probability of voting.
3.10 As the electorate is heterogeneous, campaigns with knowledge of the individual voters can use this informa-
tion to their strategic advantage. For example, a voter may be amenable to supporting the candidate (e.g.,
P (H) = 0.52), and would respond favourably to persuasive attempts (P (T ) = 0.8 & P (E) = 0.8). This voter
would represent a swing voterwho sees the candidate as credible, butwho is still undecidedwith regards to the
specific issue 3. However, if that voter is incredibly unlikely to participate in the election (e.g.,P (V ote) = 0.02),
they may no longer be relevant. Thus, candidates with information about individual voters can develop data-
driven strategies to identify the most relevant segments of the electorate and contact them as needed.
3.11 In sum, Madsen and Pilditch initiate a heterogeneous electorate (who dier in belief in the hypothesis, percep-
tion of each candidate, and likelihood of voting) who are contacted by candidates throughout the election. The
model can measure the impact of having information about the electorate and compare this with stochastic
campaign strategies. To make the comparison more direct, candidates in the model reach n number of vot-
ers each “day” (tick) in the simulation. For example, the stochastic campaign may reach 100 randomly chosen
voters per day while the MTC candidate only reaches 20. Figure 1 describes the model flow.
Figure 1: Flow chart of Election campaign simulation. Sourced fromMadsen & Pilditch (2018).
3.12 TheMadsen&Pilditch (2018)model oers aquantifiablemethod for testing theeect of informationdissemina-
tion strategies. Specifically, they compare the persuasive success of a stochastic campaignwith that of amicro-
targeted campaign that may target voters who will be favourably disposed toward the candidate, P (Cred) >
0.5 4, are swing voters, 0.3 < P (H) < 0.7, and who are likely to vote, P (V ote) > 0.5.
3.13 The current strategy is motivated by three observations. First, as the simulated election campaign does not
allow for Get-Out-The-Vote eorts to increase the probability of voting (Green & Gerber 2008), it becomes in-
creasingly ineective to persuade voters, as they are increasingly unlikely to turn out on Election Day. This
motivates the strategy of only trying to persuade voters who are likely to turn out, P (V ote) > 0.5. Further,
as voters in this model use perceived candidate credibility to update their beliefs given reports from that can-
didate, the candidate should only contact voters who will be positive toward a report. In the Bayesian model,
this means any voter with P (Cred) > 0.5. Finally, the candidate only engages with swing voters. The can-
didate will not gain anything from trying to persuade voters who are already in the candidate’s base (strongly
supporting of the candidate). Comparatively, itmight be possible to persuade voterswho are strongly opposed
to the candidate, but this requires significant eort that might be more eectively spent elsewhere. Thus, in
the model, the micro-targeting candidate only contacts swing voters, 0.3 < P (H) < 0.7, for maximum gain.
Of course, if voters who used to be in the candidate’s base are persuaded by an opposing candidate during the
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course of the campaign, they once again become relevant, as they enter the realm of swing voters – in this way,
the micro-targeting campaign can react to changes to the electorate, as the campaign unfolds 5.
3.14 As illustrated in Figure 1, the model progresses thusly. In the initialisation, voters and candidates are spawned.
Voters draw their cognitive parameters, P (H), P (T ), P (E), P (V ote), as described above. Having generated
the electorate, themodel begins running. In each simulated step, the candidates contactX voters (X is defined
by their ‘reach’). The stochastic candidate contacts voters at random, and the micro-targeting candidate iden-
tifies relevant voters as described in the above and contacts them. Having made contact, voters update their
beliefs using the Bayesian model described in the above. This process of contact and belief revision continues
until the end of the campaign (here, 100 rounds of contact and revision). Finally, at the end of the campaign,
the voters decide whether or not to vote and if so, for whom, as described in the above.
Extending themodel: Multiple policy issues and relative weights
3.15 While providing the formal framework for testing the eectiveness of micro-targeted campaigns in principle,
voters in Madsen & Pilditch (2018) only consider one policy issue. That is, the voting agents vote for one can-
didate or the other given interactions with those candidates, perceived as more or less credible. However, as
discussed in the introduction, modern societies are diverse and complex. Consequently, the electorate can be
expected to also be increasingly heterogeneous where elections revolve around a series of political questions
such as taxation, the economy, jobs, security, individual’s rights, and many other things. As the electorate be-
comes increasingly diverse in hopes, political preferences, and opinions, knowledge of the electorate can, in
principle, be used to gauge themost eective message topic for a voter (e.g., contacting voter 1with economic
messages while voter 2 is contacted with environmental messages).
3.16 To capture the increased heterogeneity within a population, we extend the Madsen and Pilditch model to en-
able voters to consider specific policy issues. In the current model runs, voters consider up to 3 policies. How-
ever, given the formal instantiation described below, the model can in principle be expanded so that voters
may consider any number of policies. This enables the model to testMTC eectiveness as the electorate be-
comesmoremulti-facetted. Additionally, while voters may be aware of a political issue, they may not consider
it relevant or important. For example, some voters may choose their preferred candidate for their stance on
labour rights and environmental issues while another may choose the candidate due to their views on foreign
and economic policies. In this scenario, both voters may hold positions on four political issues, butweigh the
issues dierently. For example, two voters may hold the same position on labour policies (e.g., both are pro
workers’ rights), but the twomay dier in terms of how important they feel this is (e.g., given current economy,
other issues, etc.), resulting in dierent weights (e.g., w = 0.85 vs 0.25). Thus, if the first voter remains some-
what unconvinced about a candidate’s labour policy, we should expect the voter to refrain from supporting
that candidate. Comparatively, if the second voter does not approve of the candidate’s labour policy, it should
not impact the voting outcomemuch, as the weight is low. Of course, the two voters could also hold similar or
dierent positions on another policy (e.g., foreign policy), but weight these in an entirely dierent manner. In
otherwords, voters donotmerely have a rank-order of policies (1, 2, 3), butmay imbue these rankswithweights
to reflect what really makes them choose one candidate over another. This allows for a voting population that
includes single issue voters (1 policy highly weighted), multiple-issue / highly engaged voters (multiple highly
weighted policies), disengaged voters (all policies have low weights), and combinations thereof.
3.17 Weightedpreferencesovermultiple policies addanadditional information layer thatmicro-targeted campaign-
ers may use. Formally, in the current model, anMTC candidate uses their knowledge of the electorate to
gradually “zero-in” on viable targets. This unfolds in several stages. First, the contactable voters are restricted
to those who perceive the candidate positively (P (Cred) > 0.5), of these, those are more inclined to vote
(P (V ote) > 0.5). At this point we depart from the Madsen & Pilditch (2018) model by restricting this subset
further to those with a policy position in the acceptable (persuadable) range (0.3 < P (PolH) < 0.7, where
P (PolH) corresponds to P (H) in the previous model) and of suicient weight (P (Polw) > 0.6). If the resul-
tant subset is larger than the possible reach of theMTC (i.e., there are more viable voters than theMTC can
target that day), the remaining viable subset is selected based on those with the highest viable policy weights.
Aer targeting is completed, the remaining subset has their highest weighted viable policy “pushed” or per-
suaded by the campaign. In comparison to the original model, this enables the micro-targeted campaign to
target the most potent policy issue with regards to the voter’s preferences and relative weights. A stochastic
campaign, by contrast, having selected their voters for targeting randomly, also selects the policy to “push” to
those voters randomly as well.
3.18 At the conclusion of campaigning, all voting agents will then vote with a probability corresponding to their
P (V ote) value. Who to vote for is decided based on a weighted average of policy positions, wherein the dis-
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tance of a policy position (P (PolH)) away from 0.5 (towards 0 favoring one candidate, towards 1 towards the
other) is multiplied by the weight of that policy. These weighted policies are then averaged, with a final voting
decision based on whether this aggregate is greater or less than 0.5 (with voters le at 0.5 deciding between
the two candidates randomly). In the simulated experiment below, we implement these functions to track the
eectiveness of micro-targeted campaigns for increasingly heterogeneous electorates.
Simulation Results
4.1 Our simulations, programmedwithNetlogoand runwithinRusing theRNetlogopackage (Thiele2014), entail an
election campaignwith 2 campaigns (a stochastic, traditional campaign agent, and anMTC campaign agent),
who are each trying to persuade a voting population (10, 000 “voter” agents) towards their candidate. This
is defined along a dimension from 0 (favouring the stochastic campaign candidate) to 1 (favouring theMTC
campaign candidate). The model used here is also described by Figure 1 above, with the exception of policies
(P (PolH)), rather than a single belief in the candidates (P (H)) forming the basis of targeting, updating, and
eventual voting.
4.2 Across simulations, we manipulate a number of parameters independently via shiing the Gaussian distri-
butions from which voters sample their parameter values. Whilst the P (V ote) distribution is held constant
(P (V ote): µ = 0.5,σ = 0.25), theperceivedcredibilityof campaignsaremanipulated independently (P (Cred):
µMTC = [0.4, 0.5, 0.6], σMTC = 0.25; µStochastic = [0.4, 0.5, 0.6], σStochastic = 0.25) between simulations.
The policy positions (P (PolH)n−1) and weights of those positions (P (Polw)n−1) held by each voter are ma-
nipulated within each simulation.
4.3 On each campaigning “day” (or tick), each campaign reached out to a set number of voters (whether targeted
in the case of theMTC, or randomly selected in the case of the stochastic campaign). Stochastic campaign
reach was increased in multiples of theMTC campaign reach, such that the latter remained at 20 voters per
day, whilst the former increases from 20 to 200, in steps of 20 (and thus in ratio from 1 : 10).
4.4 Alongwith themanipulationofeach respectivecandidate/campaign’sperceivedcredibilityandcampaign reach,
the number of policies voters took into consideration was increased from 1 (essentially replicating previous
work without policy dierences, see Madsen & Pilditch 2018) to 2, to 3. These policies were all independently
drawn from truncated Gaussian distributions for both positions (P (PolH)n−1: µ = 0.5, σ = 0.25) and weights
(P (Polw)n−1: µ = 0.5, σ = 0.25), such that although each individual voter will have a random collection
of policy positions, with those positions randomly assigned weights. We note that as all weight parameters,
much like credibility and voting parameters, were drawn from truncated Gaussian distributions, parameters
were always between 0 and 1. In this way, although each individual voter will have a random collection of pol-
icy positions and weights, the global aggregate across voters and positions does not favor either campaign.
Given the independent random sampling of these positions and weights, it thus remains possible for voters to
be highly engaged / multiple issue voters (e.g., multiple policies with high weights), disengaged (e.g., multiple
policies with lowweights), or single issue voters (e.g., one policy with a high weight, the rest low) – irrespective
of the policy positions themselves.
4.5 Aer the end of the campaigning stage, consisting of 100 “days” or ticks – with voters updating their policy be-
liefs in relation to the two campaigns accordingly, each voter casts their vote (with probability P (V ote)) based
on the weighted averaging of policy positions described above, and the simulation concludes. Each combi-
nation of manipulated variables (i.e., permutations) is run 100 times, with the results (the proportion of votes
between the two campaigns) averaged per permutation.
Manipulations summary
4.6 Across the simulated voting population of agents, the likelihood of voting (P (V ote)), the positions voters take
on policies (P (PolH)) and the weights assigned to those policies (P (Polw)) are heterogeneous across voters,
and are re-sampled at the start of eachmodel run. These variables, alongwith the campaign duration (100days
or “ticks”), reach of theMTC (20 voters per day), and the size of the voting population (10, 000 voters) are not
manipulated across simulations.
4.7 Campaign Manipulations: Only the reach of the stochastic campaign is manipulated across simulations, from
20 voters per day (on par with theMTC reach), up to 200 voters per day (in increments of 20, resulting in 10
levels).
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4.8 Voter Manipulations: There are three variables manipulated across simulations among voting agents. First, the
number of policies voters consider is manipulated across simulations from 1 to 3 (3 levels). Second, the mean
of the distribution from which voters draw their perceived credibility of theMTC campaign (MTC P(Cred))
is manipulated as either less credible (0.4), neutral (0.5), or more credible (0.6) across simulations (3 levels).
Lastly the perceived credibility of the stochastic campaign (Stochastic / non-MTC P (Cred)) is manipulated
independently in the same fashion (3 levels).
4.9 Consequently, the simulation consists of 10 × 3 × 3 × 3 = 270 permutations, with each permutation run 100
times (resulting in 27, 000 runs), with the results of the 100 runs averaged for each permutation
Simulation results
4.10 In replication of Madsen & Pilditch (2018) we find that in single policy (Figure 2, solid lines) scenarios, theMTC
generally outperforms the stochastic campaign (lines belowbreak-evenpointmeana lowerpercentageof votes
for the stochastic campaign, and a corresponding higher percentage of votes for theMTC). The only exception
to this is when the stochastic campaign is generally perceived as being credible (Figure 2, bottom row, non-
MTC P (Cred) = 0.6) and is suiciently larger than theMTC campaign (approximately 2.5 times the size) –
a finding that also replicates previous work.
4.11 Whenthestochastic campaign isgenerallyperceived tobe less credible (Figure2, top row, non-MTCP (Cred) =
0.4) we find a “backfire” eect of the stochastic campaign as it increases in size. In essence, as the stochastic
campaign tries to (randomly) reachmore andmore voters per day (le to right on theX − axis), the campaign
unintentionally dissuades more voters than they persuade. That is, if the candidate targets a voter who finds
the candidate to be unbelievable, the persuasivemessage backfires andmakes the voter believe the candidate
less than before the persuasive attempt. More intuitively, we can think of this as an increased chance of voters
who may otherwise have aligned with the campaign being “put o” by the low credibility candidate being the
source of the persuasivemessage (“I was inclined towards partyX , but then their candidate contactedme. . .”).
As in previous work, this trend is mitigated as the perceived credibility of the candidate increases (e.g., Figure
2, middle row, non-MTC P (Cred) = 0.5) 6.
Figure 2: Voting outcome of simulated election campaigns. Outcome is described as the percentage of votes
for the stochastic (non-MTC) campaign. The dashed horizontal line at 50% represents the break-even point
between vote-shares.
4.12 Given the targeting capability ofMTCs,we find that theMTC avoids theaforementionedbackfire eects. This
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is illustrated by the similarity of results across the diering perceptions of credibility for theMTC campaign
(Figure 2, columns)whereMTC can yield the sameadvantagewhether their candidate / campaign is generally
perceived to have low (le-hand column), neutral (middle column) or high (right-hand column) credibility.
4.13 Finally, we turn to the increasing complexity of voters, represented by the increasing number of policies under
consideration (Figure 2, solid line = 1 policy, short dash = 2 policies, long dash = 3 policies). Here we find that
despite the inclusion of this complexity,MTCs generally retain their advantages over stochastic campaigns,
successfully navigating the possibilities of single-issue voters, multiple issue voters, generally disengaged vot-
ers, andmore. We do note that this complexity, when considered in light of the voting decision, tempers the ca-
pacity of the stochastic campaign – both tomitigate backfire eects (slower decreasing trends when perceived
stochastic campaign credibility is generally low, Figure 2, top row) and reduce persuasive eicacy (delayed up-
ward trends when perceived stochastic campaign credibility is generally high, Figure 2, bottom row).
Discussion
5.1 Thepaper extends anagent-basedmodel ofmicro-targeted campaign strategies throughadding additional het-
erogeneity and sophistication to the voter within the model. In particular, we extend the model in two central
ways. One, rather than considering just one policy, voters can now considermultiple political issues when they
decide whom to support in the election. In real life, this is closer to how voters approach candidates, as studies
show citizens consider multiple political questions (e.g., Horiuchi et al. 2018). Two, we enable voters to rank
political issues as more or less important. Similar to considering multiple issues when choosing a candidate,
votersmay find some issues to bemore important than others. This is reflected in weighted preferences across
themultiple policy issues. This allows us to heterogeneously produce various forms of voters; single issue (one
policy highlyweighted),multiple issues / high engagement (multiple policies highlyweighted), and disengaged
voters (all policies have lowweights). These are of course crossedwith diering political positions (i.e., a single-
issue swing-voter, single issueparty voter, etc.). Thus, thepaperexplores theprincipledbenefitsofMTCswhen
the electorate becomes increasingly complex and heterogeneous.
5.2 In line with expectations, we findMTCs to be eective and eicient in navigating this more complex voter-
space, consistently yielding a voting advantage over their stochastic counterparts. Furthermore, whilst the in-
creasing reach of a stochastic campaign can either result in increasing backfire eects when they are perceived
to have low credibility, or gradual advantage if perceived to have high credibility,MTCs appear to be eective
irrespective of general perceptions of credibility. We note these twin eects are critical to bear in mind when
considering prospective political campaigns. Those with a candidate who (perhaps unusually) is generally per-
ceived to be highly credible can benefit from an increasingly large campaign reach, though this can arguably
be curtailed by campaign finance laws – something that speaks to the general advantage ofMTCs in terms of
potential eiciency. Contrary to the case with a candidate perceived to be highly credible, if one either knows
the prospective candidate to have a perceived credibility that is neutral or low, or one does not know the per-
ceived credibility of the candidate, then anMTCs will always yield an advantage among a diverse electorate,
with necessary reach being dictated by the credibility of the opponent.
5.3 There is one further important implication of the current findings. When an election campaign revolves around
a single issue, identity, or candidate (e.g., US presidential campaigns), as opposed to more nuanced, multi-
facetted campaigns (e.g., multi-party parliamentary elections), the former is in factmore susceptible to amicro-
targeting advantage. This in part is explained by the cumbersomeness of traditional campaigning (i.e., the
aforementioned potential to incur backfire eects on prospective voters) being more exposed. Put another
way, a single poorly-targeted message is likely to completely turn away a voter if there is only one issue under
consideration, but when multiple issues are under consideration, a voter is only likely to be partially turned
away.
5.4 Extending the cognitive components of the original model allows for increased realism within model simula-
tions. Additionally, as the electorate becomes increasingly complex, the model can test dierent information
dissemination strategies by varying whom to contact, when to contact them, and with what to talk to them.
In the current simulations, the micro-targeted campaign targets the swing voters who are favourably disposed
towards the candidate and who are likely to vote. However, more sophisticated choice models can be imple-
mented (e.g., calculating expected gain for segments of the electorate in order to optimize targeting). In other
words, as the population becomesmore realistic, themodel oers a formal method to test the eectiveness of
competing information strategies.
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5.5 While the model oers a step towards greater cognitive realism on part of the simulated electorate, there are
several avenues for future research. First, while voters in the current model represent a significant step to-
wards a more realistic voter model, there are several models in political theory and science to describe how
voters choose a candidate (see e.g., Lodge & Taber 2013). For the purpose of the model framework presented
here and in Madsen & Pilditch (2018), it is irrelevant whether there is a universal model or if voter models are
culture-specific. The model enables users to input any computational voter assumption within the model,
which can be used to test the eectiveness ofmicro-targeted campaigns (or other campaign strategies) for that
voter model and for that electorate. Future work should collate voter models and explore the eectiveness of
micro-targeting for dierent voter assumptions, including the impact of “backfire eects” on findings (but see
also e.g., correlating policy positions and weights, and thus stepping towards representations of political po-
larization among an electorate). Second, research in social psychology has identified psychometric traits as a
possible factor in political decision-making (see e.g., Block & Block 2006; Sibley et al. 2012). Future workmight
explore the appropriateness of these assumptions and whether they impact campaign strategies (for a study
on impact of the eect of campaigning via social media, see Bright et al. 2020). Lastly, the assumption ofMTC
data accuracy used in the present model is a strong one. Although campaigns have been shown to have access
to the type of data used here, there remain open questions regarding the influence of “noisiness” in this data,
both on generalMTC eicacy, and the selection of optimal strategies for (repeated) contacting. This trade-o
between data fidelity andMTC strategic eicacy is an important avenue for future research. More broadly, it is
not clear what parameters are most diagnostic for segmenting the electorate (personality traits, policy prefer-
ences, etc.). As such, the degree of noise concerning electorate data, themost diagnostic signals, and the avail-
ability of data throughout a given election cycle will be incredibly context-dependent. As these parameters of
the proposedmodel can be adjusted to fit a given situation, the paper provides a foundational state-of-the-art
methodological tool that enables researchers in political science to test assumptions, intuitions, and models
in a formal, repeatable manner. Here, we have reported simulations for a situation where data about the elec-
torate is clear and campaigns have access to shiing data throughout the election cycle (e.g. via polls or other
means).
5.6 Third, information dissemination models and models of beliefs cascading show that bottom-up connectivity
between citizens may drive how information is spread, belief formation, and emergent echo chambers (e.g.,
Duggins 2017; Madsen & Pilditch 2018; Ngampruetikorn & Stephens 2016). In the current model, communi-
cation is top-down, as candidates contact voters. To represent the complex information systems inherent in
21st Century election campaigns, future work should integrate social structure and voter-to-voter communi-
cation. Fourth, the micro-targeting candidate in the current paper follows one set strategy. As demonstrated
within game-theoretic paradigms, competitive agents may adopt dierent strategies, may switch strategy dur-
ing the game, ormay cancel out strategic advantages of an opponent. Futureworkmay explore dierentmicro-
targeting strategies, the evolution of campaign strategies between micro-targeted campaigns, and what hap-
pens in multi-party systems.
5.7 Finally, agent-based models can be used to calibrate and validate competing models against observable data
and be used to test plausible system interventions to make election as equal and fair between candidates as
possible (Madsen 2019). While all of these represent intriguing avenues of future research, the current paper,
in line with Madsen & Pilditch (2018), provides the foundational computational method through which all of
these inherently complex and dynamic questions can be explored. Critically, themodel enables researchers to
test the impact of information dissemination strategies in principle. That is, the model goes beyond the just-so
stories of specific electionswheremultiple factorsmay have caused the candidatewith access to data towin or
lose. By implementing assumptions within the present model framework, we can quantifiably test the specific
advantage of knowing the electorate.
5.8 Thepaper focusesonpoliticalmicro-targeting. However, themethoddescribeshow informationcanbedissem-
inated most eectively in principle and can thus be applied to any number of domains such as public health
campaigns, PSAs, and advertisement (the latter is familiar to anyone who has Googled ‘holidays in Berlin’ and
subsequently gotten advertisements for flights to or hotels in that city). It is likely that personal- and societal-
level data becomes increasingly accessible in the coming years. In addition, the electorates inmost representa-
tive democracies are becoming increasingly heterogeneous and complex. This paper shows data-driven, psy-
chologically informed campaigns gain strategic advantages when heterogeneity increases. For this reason, it
is imperative that we understand andmodel when and howmicro-targeting strategies work in order to ensure
fair and democratic elections going forward.
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Model Documentation
The agent-based model is written and simulated in NetLogo (release 6.0.4). The simulations were run and
data collected and processed using the RNetlogo package in R (Thiele 2014). All files containing the simulation
model’s codeareaccessibleathttps://www.comses.net/codebases/0ecd5574-99ed-40da-b190-6a1b5786edd5/
releases/1.0.0/.Themodel folderalsocontainsa separatepdf file (“MTCModelBasicUseDocumentation.pdf”)
detailing the information needed to understand the model and replicate results.
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Appendix
Breakdown of the Bayesian Source Credibility Model
As described in themanuscript (see Equation 1), the probability that a hypothesis is true given a positive report
from a source can be calculated using the theorem from Harris et al. (2016):
P (H|Rep) = P (H)P (Rep|H)
P (H)P (Rep|H) + P (¬H)P (Rep|¬H)
P (H) is simple, as it merely represents the current belief of the recipient (ranging from 0 to 1). To integrate
perceived expertise, P (E), and perceived trustworthiness, P (T ), the conditional probability, P(Rep|H) can be
used. To calculate this, Harris et al. (2016) provide the following equation on p. 17:
P (Rep|H) = P (Rep|H,E, T ) ∗ P (E) ∗ P (T ) + P (Rep|H,E,¬T ) ∗ P (E) ∗ P (¬T )+
P (Rep|H,¬E, T ) ∗ P (¬E) ∗ P (T ) + P (Rep|H,¬E, T ) ∗ P (¬E) ∗ P (¬T )
Unpacking this equation, we find complicated conditional probabilities such as P (Rep|H,E, T ). This particu-
lar conditional should be read as the probability that the source would say the hypothesis is TRUE in a world
where the hypothesis is actually TRUEandwhere the source has total expertise in the relevant field (i.e. relat-
ing to the hypothesis) and where the source is completely trustworthy. For example, if a medical professional
who has total expertise and is completely to be trusted, what is the probability that they would provide a true
report if the report happens to be true?
To integrate perceived expertise,P (E), and trustworthiness,P (T ), these aremultiplied with the relevant con-
ditional probability. For example, if the recipient believes that a fully trusted and expert witness is very likely
to provide a positive report given a true hypothesis (P (Rep|H,E, T ) = 0.8), the impact of the report is mod-
erated by the perceived expertise and trustworthiness. Thus, if P (E) = 0.34 and P (T ) = 0.61, even a true
report from that source would not impact the recipient much. To calculate P (Rep|¬H), the same equation is
used (withH replaced with¬H). That is:
P (Rep|¬H) = P (Rep|¬H,E, T ) ∗ P (E) ∗ P (T ) + P (Rep|¬H,E,¬T ) ∗ P (E) ∗ P (¬T )+
P (Rep|¬H,¬E, T ) ∗ P (¬E) ∗ P (T ) + P (Rep|¬H,¬E,¬T ) ∗ P (¬E) ∗ P (¬T )
Here, conditional probabilities shouldbe read ina similarway. That is, P(Rep|¬H,E, T) represents theprobability
that the source would say the hypothesis is FALSE in a world where the hypothesis is actually TRUE and
where the source has total expertise in the relevant field (i.e. relating to the hypothesis) and where the source
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is completely trustworthy. As described in the manuscript, values for the 8 conditional probabilities are taken
fromMadsen (2016) who sourced these empirically from respondents, yielding Table 1 from themanuscript.
Given the above, the Bayesian Source Credibility model can now compute the posterior degree of belief in the
hypothesis,H , given a positive report, Rep, froma source. As described in this appendix and in themanuscript,
the impact of this report depends on the prior belief, P (H), perceived expertise, P (E), and perceived trust-
worthiness, P (T ).
Notes
1In addition to using demographic data, digital data, such as people’s search history, can be used to explore
interesting facets of desires, beliefs, and social phenomena (Stephens-Davidowitz 2017). This, in turn, can be
used to generate increasingly sophisticated voter profiles for micro-targeting purposes.
2For a full formal model of conditional probabilities, see the complete Bayesian Source Credibility model
description in the Appendix
3While election outcome in this model framework is dependent on the beliefs of the electorate, there are
many theories and models of candidate choice (see e.g., Lodge & Taber 2013). Critically, the model presented
here is able to test the eectiveness of micro-targeting campaigns for any computationally expressible voter
theory/model. Thus, the agent-basedmethod presented provides a canvas that can be used for exploring com-
peting voter theory and how campaign strategies would unfold, given those assumptions.
4This can be considered an amalgam of P (T ) and P (E) for the purposes of the model.
5As discussed in the above, the model can represent any computationally expressible voter theory/model.
Similarly, the model can represent and test the eectiveness of any computationally expressible campaign
strategy (i.e., dierent strategies to segment and target the electorate).
6Of course, the reported backfire eect is a product of the particular cognitivemodel implemented for belief
revision. Some initial empirical evidence suggests that this happenswhendislikedcandidatesprovidespolitical
suggestions (Madsen 2016), it remains an open question as to whether or not this happens for real-life political
messages and how best to represent this function computationally. However, as the current paper provides a
method in principle, competing voter models may, as discussed in the above, be tested.
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